Human Lives Human Rights: If a curious researcher were to investigate the history of the terrorist organization known as MKO, they would discover that one of the tactics frequently employed by this dangerous group, particularly in times of crisis, is the repeated implementation of violent acts resulting in death and destruction.
Despite the absurdity of this approach, such anti-human organizations continue to utilize it. Prior to conducting a thorough analysis of this matter, it is important to establish a clear definition of the term “killing,” which refers to the act of causing physical harm resulting in death.
The act of killing involves the intentional and often indiscriminate elimination of innocent civilians and ordinary individuals in order to advance the political objectives of a particular individual or organization.
In the subsequent discussion, we will explore the underlying reasons and contributing factors that lead to the implementation of this violent strategy, in order to fully comprehend its scope and impact. However, it is crucial to first establish the specific circumstances and contexts in which Rajavi’s followers resort to this form of brutality against the vulnerable members of society.
Based on historical evidence, it has been observed that the MKO employs violent tactics against the general population in the following scenarios:.
1. The MKO engages in military operations with the intention of both suppressing and utilizing civilians as human shields. In some cases, they resort to killing innocent individuals out of fear or as a means of initiating the violent cycle.
2. The MKO considers periods of social unrest and chaos as opportune moments to carry out their killing campaigns. Since the 1980s, this extremist group has shamelessly employed this heinous tactic during times of relative stability and security, in order to demonstrate their strength and intimidate both the general public and the government.
3. As the Mojahedin e Khalq are essentially mercenaries of foreign powers, their leaders receive directives from foreign politicians and political think tanks. Consequently, this extremist group is tasked with harboring animosity towards the Iranian nation. In order to generate revenue for their cult leaders in Albania, they resort to either self-sacrifice or the killing of innocent Kurds.
4. The act of killing serves as a potent tool for inciting fear and concern among the general public. The MKO is well aware of the vulnerability of the common people in this regard, and thus resorts to killing innocent individuals as a means of generating publicity and manipulating public opinion. By exploiting the emotional impact of such violent acts, this extremist group seeks to advance their sinister agenda and achieve their goals through the manipulation of public sentiment.
5. The ideology of the Mojahedin e Khalq is heavily influenced by left-wing guerrilla movements, which are known for their use of terror tactics in order to overthrow the political systems of their opponents. As a result, the MKO seeks to instill fear and promote a sense of insecurity within society, with the ultimate goal of utilizing this atmosphere to wage war against the existing political system.
One of the justifications cited by the terrorist organization known as the People’s Mujahideen for their transition to a military phase on June 20, 1981, was the claim that the Islamic Republic regime had not only monopolized political discourse, but had also violently suppressed their gatherings, demonstrations, speeches, and even the sale of their publications. By resorting to physical assault and killing their supporters, the regime had effectively closed off any space for political activity on the part of the People’s Mujahideen.
After the arrest of some members and officials of the terrorist group’s strike teams during the years 1979 to 1981, it became clear that this group had formed Hezbollah-like and Basiji-style teams in the same political phase. In addition to implementing a policy of confrontation with the people, they disrupted their gatherings, including newspaper sales booths, demonstrations, and speeches, by attacking individuals with knives, clubs, and machetes, killing them. They did this to provide fodder for their propaganda machine using the phenomenon of killing and its sensationalization, attract more people using a display of victimhood, and expand their activities toward armed rebellion.
The first victim of this assassination campaign was a supporter of the Mojahedin named Abbas Amani, who was severely beaten by these same teams of Mujahideen-e Khalq (MEK) on 18 January 1980, on the eve of the first presidential election. He suffered a brain hemorrhage and, according to the presented report by the central authority, was taken to the hospital too late to save him, in order to provide propaganda material for the candidacy of the leader of this group, Massoud Rajavi, in the aforementioned election – he was supposed to be disqualified from the list of candidates the next day due to failure to meet the constitutional voting requirement.
As a result, Rajavi made the most of Amani’s death in his first speech after being removed from the list of presidential candidates, and based his speech on exploiting his death. It was in that speech that he revealed his true face as a hypocrite, after about a year of posing as a revolutionary and claiming allegiance to the Imam. He dared to threaten the Islamic Republic system with armed rebellion, saying, “Woe to the day when we decide to respond fist to fist and bullet to bullet.”
After Amani’s murder by Rajavi’s hit teams, the killing spree continued, and from time to time, one of the MEK supporters would be murdered during the sale of the newspaper, or in protests and rallies, or in speeches (which were held with the permission of the Ministry of Interior and even the city administration in those days), and as June 20, the promised day of the Rajavi cult approached closer to Western spy services (especially France), these assassinations increased.
Morteza Nasrpoor, who was in charge of several hit teams during the meeting at Amjadiyeh Stadium (current Shiroodi Stadium) in June 1980, wrote about this:
“During the Amjadiyeh incident, complete advantage was taken of the conflict that occurred when an organization member was killed. When the opponent was wounded, they spun him around so much that he was not taken to a doctor and died. Yes, one person was deliberately killed to open the way for an upgrade in the struggle, it is not a problem.”
Sadegh Al-Mousavi, another student activist and responsible for 5 hit teams at Amjadiyeh, wrote about this:
“The day before, they had learned various knife techniques and other karate movements. Throughout Amjadiyeh, Mojahedin forces were ready with helmets, maces, and stones to attack from all sides.
Therefore, they consciously and intentionally created turmoil and chaos while portraying themselves as victims. The leader of this terrorist group announced this organizational line to his supporters and members at that time:
“…We strongly need the majority of the masses to realize our innocence in creating such a war (civil war)…. Therefore, we must show that we have exhausted all possible ways and also exercised all necessary patience to reach that point…”
On November 4, 1979, the same day that Muslim student followers of the Imam’s line seized the US embassy, the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) held a ceremony at the Teachers’ Training University, where Saeed Shahsavan, one of their high-ranking members, was scheduled to speak. Notably, student association officials had told attendees at the event to bring a knife or machete to combat Hezbollah supporters, even though no particular conflict had yet arisen between MEK members and the public.
After the events of November 4, the MEK continued to hold rallies and protests with the permission of the Ministry of Interior, and they urged their supporters to come armed not only with cold weapons like knives and batons but also to dress in military or militia garb to prepare themselves mentally and spiritually for any potential clashes.
Mojtaba Nasrpoor, an activist in the student section and logistics of the MEK, wrote about instigating conflicts:
“In many of these conflicts, the instigators were supporters who appeared as ordinary people to create disturbances.”
Firouz Ahmadzadeh, a captain in eastern Tehran’s neighborhoods, also stated:
“A few days before the onset of riots on Mobarezan Street (now known as Shohada Street), one of the organization’s top groups explained that the MEK should remain less visible in society, and since our period of stagnation has begun, we should become more visible by crowding into kiosks and newspaper selling spots… A few days later, the conflict began there, with the MEK being the main culprit, which sparked the clash through one of its infiltrators named Hamid Taleghani.”
Regarding the crimes committed by the MEK on June 20, 1981, Mohammad Hossein Amirani, one of the captains at the time, confessed:
“At the home of Haider, where MEK supporters had gathered (located behind the Chit-Sazi intersection and the team house of the message association), they were given a knife each and were ready to fight. They said that the knife was part of their mission as newspaper sellers, and if they sold newspapers until yesterday, today they must use it. “
Raza Hamzaeinjead, head of the student-military team of the MEK, also stated:
“The MEK’s line on that day was to arm themselves and create conflicts and killings using both cold and hot weapons… Some members of the formations in that rally were armed with hot weapons… The line was to kill as many people as possible.”
Despite all these crimes, the terrorist MEK group continued to present itself as victimized, and in a statement, it wrote: “Once again, in the final stages of absolute domination and suffocation, simultaneously with the dismissal of President Dr. Bani-Sadr… hundreds of thousands of Tehran’s heroic people were dragged into the dust and bloodshed by a peaceful demonstration.”